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Introduction 
Ever since Locke published the ‘Molyneux Problem,’ in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694), philosophical 
discussions surrounding it have been concerned with whether there 
are innate cross-modal connections in the mind, or if the mind is 
unimodal. A cross-modal connection is where representational 
content is shared, or inferred, by two or more sense modalities. Under 
a unimodal conception, mental connections between representational 
content are thought to occur only after experience. Rationalists have 
typically affirmed cross-modal connections in the mind, but 
empiricists have denied such a possibility, maintaining that 
connections between the various modalities are made only after a 
sufficient amount of experience has occurred. For his part, Locke, 
agreeing with Molyneux, held the opinion that such connections could 
only be known for certain through experience. Many have argued that 
Locke, by answering in the affirmative, has put a strain on the 
consistency of his epistemology and philosophy of mind.1 In this 
essay, I will show that it is within the scope of Locke’s body of work 
for him to consistently maintain cross-modal connections are another 
faculty of the mind, while the verification of that faculty’s 
representational content must be empirically verified to be veridical. I 
hope to achieve this by analyzing Locke’s notion and use of 
judgment, and paying close attention to how his views on causation 
evolved throughout his career. 
 
1For an excellent overview of the reaction to the Molyneux question, and 
Locke’s answer to it, by the early modern philosophers, see: John Davis, “The 
Molyneux Problem,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no. 3 (1960): 392-408.  
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In order to tease out my interpretation of Locke, I will begin with 
a layout of the Molyneux problem, providing a historical sketch, and 
note some early criticism. Next, I will highlight the pertinent points in 
Locke’s philosophy, and then critically examine a recent paper by 
Ralph Schumacher in which he claims that Locke’s use of judgment is 
untenable given his empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. 
These taken together, I believe, provide the means for a consistent 
answer to the Molyneux Problem.    
 
A Historical Sketch 
 Irish scientist William Molyneux (1656-1698), after reading the 
first edition of Locke’s Essay, wrote to Locke, sending his famous 
thought experiment. In the Essay, Locke inquired whether a person 
born blind, who could by touch distinguish the shape of a sphere from 
the shape of a cube, would be able, upon gaining their sight, 
distinguish the shapes without touching them?2 Molyneux answered 
his question by claiming that although the person has gained the 
experience of these shapes by touch, they have yet to gain the 
experience of how their touch affects their sight. In other words, 
according to Molyneux, the cognitive mechanism needed to associate 
the mental content gained from the modality of sight with the content 
gained from touch is created by experience. Conversely, if the 
identification were to be made upon sight, the cognitive mechanism 
would be innate. Epistemically, this boils down to the prior claiming 
the distinction can only be known through experience, while the latter 
claims it can be made known through reason. 
John Locke inserted Molyneux’s thought experiment in the 
second edition of the Essay, where it remained through each 
subsequent edition. Locke agreed with Molyneux’s answer, claiming 
that at first sight the person would not be able to say for certain which 
shape was which, though they could name them by touch. Locke 
supports this claim by appealing to an act of judgment which through 
 
2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. 
Nidditch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), II.ix.8. All references to the 
Essay will cite Peter H. Nidditch’s 1979 edition in the order of book, chapter, and 
section. 
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custom seems to convert the visual input of a two-dimensional figure 
into a three-dimensional figure.3  
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) was one of the first to 
insist the need to abandon the doctrine of common sensibles in order 
to justify a negative answer. Descartes and Locke were largely 
credited with rediscovering the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities from Aristotle, who had distinguished between 
common sensibles and proper sensibles.4  
Under the heading of common sensibles are qualities such as 
extension, figure, motion, rest, and number. The proper sensibles, on 
the other hand, include the sensations of color, sound, taste, and 
temperature. It is clear Locke is committed to this distinction when he 
lists extension, figure, motion, and rest as ideas we get from both 
seeing and feeling.5 With this in mind, Berkeley argued that if the 
figure of an object perceived by touch is the same figure perceived by 
sight, then nothing new is introduced in one’s mind.6 That is to say, if 
there is a cross-modal connection, at least relative to figure, then 
Locke and Molyneux are supposedly wrong.7 Consequently, Berkeley 
defended a heterogeneous thesis where the representational ideas 
conveyed by the senses are peculiar to each individual sense. Vision 
for Berkeley was like a language with an arbitrary connection 
between the signs and what they stand in for.8  
I propose that Locke held there are two ways of accessing the 
idea of three-dimensional figure. One we receive from bodies through 
the relation of resemblance, and the other through perceiving colors 
causally. The prior is a representation of figure as the genuine article, 
with the latter just appearing as figure—which I will henceforth call 
 
3 Ibid., II.ix.8. 
4 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1986), 189-191: 425a-b. 
5 Essay, II.v.  
6 Geogre Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision (London: Aldine Press, 1969), 74-
75. 
7 I will argue below that Locke differed with Molynuex in justifying his 
negative answer.  
8 Margaret Atherton, "Berkeley's Theory of Vision and Its Reception," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (New York: 
Cambridge Press, 2005), 97. 
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zigure. In order to draw out this distinction, more needs to be said 
about Locke’s divide between ideas of primary and secondary quality, 
and how they are conveyed to the mind.   
 
Ideas of Primary and Secondary Quality 
Locke distinguishes primary qualities as those that are 
inseparable from a body. Of the primary qualities found in bodies, 
Locke lists: solidity, extension, figure, mobility, motion or rest, 
number, bulk, texture, motion, size, and situation. Locke claims that 
such qualities are found by the senses in every perceivable bulk of 
matter, and that the mind finds them in every particular particle.9 This 
notion is attested by considering Locke’s example of the division of a 
grain of wheat.10 Locke seeks to show that one can continue to divide 
an object conceptually, even when they cannot physically divide it 
any longer, yet whatever remains will be conceived of as having 
primary qualities. 
  Locke describes secondary qualities as powers possessed by 
particular particles of matter to bring about ideas in a perceiver.11 He 
holds secondary qualities as separable from bodies, and as ones that 
do not resemble bodies as they are in-themselves. Michael Jacovides 
explains, concluding from Locke’s wheat example, that although it 
can be known by reason that the minute pieces of flour retain their 
primary qualities, none of the ideas of primary quality are conveyed 
to perceivers. This is precisely because those bits of matter do not 
have powers to produce ideas of primary qualities, or else they would 
be perceived.12 Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are the powers 
of certain particles of matter that produce ideas in us. For example, 
the idea of the whiteness of the flour is conveyed to us by particles, 
which possess primary qualities, yet have the additional property of a 
power to bring about an idea of whiteness in a perceiver. Locke says 
 
9 Essay, II.viii.9. 
10 Ibid., II.viii.9. 
11 Ibid., II.viii.10. 
12 Michael Jacovides, "Locke's Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary 
Qualities," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding", ed. Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
116. 
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manna has, in addition to the primary qualities, the power to cause 
sickness in us, but the sickness is not ‘in’ the manna, it is ‘in’ us.13 
Consequently, Locke thinks of secondary qualities as separable from 
bodies. Locke explicitly says ideas of secondary qualities are not 
really ‘in’ the objects—like ideas of primary quality—but are features 
of an object’s primary qualities.14  
Locke maintains ideas of secondary quality are only represented 
as effects of their causes, and this relationship is insufficient to 
represent ideas of primary quality like figure. Thus, Locke chose the 
relation of resemblance to convey the representation of ideas of 
primary quality. Representation by way of resemblance occurs in the 
mind as images.15 Jacovides explains that the idea of figure is really 
an image of figure, and an image is any mental content of which you 
can draw a picture.16  
Thomas Lennon, commenting on Locke’s theory of 
representation, echoes Jacovides in maintaining that Locke denies that 
secondary qualities represent by resemblance as being crucial for his 
advancing of the corpuscularian theory of substance.17 On the 
corpuscularian theory, substances consist of primary qualities, such as 
figure, motion, size, etc., and secondary qualities subsist on the 
primary ones. Lennon interprets Locke as holding that ideas of 
secondary quality, like whiteness, represent and accurately correspond 
to the unit(s) in the substructure of an object, but not the structure of 
the object itself.18 Thus, Locke holds that particles of imperceptible 
bulk, relative to the modalities of sight and touch, impinge on us in a 
causal relationship to convey ideas of secondary quality. These ideas 
are mere effects of their causes. Ideas of primary quality, on the other 
hand, are conveyed by resemblance.  
 
13 Essay, II.viii.18. 
14 Ibid., II.viii.10. 
15 Ibid., II.xi.17; III.iii.7. 
16 Michael Jacovides, "Locke's Resemblance Thesis," The Philosophical 
Review 108, no. 4 (1999): 467. 
17 Thomas M. Lennon, "Locke on Ideas and Representation," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," ed. 
Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge Press, 2007), 247.	
18 Ibid., 249. 
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There are broadly two interpretations of how Locke might think 
primary qualities are conveyed to the mind. Both interpretations agree 
that Locke comes to admit that the explanatory scope of 
corpuscularian mechanism is limited in some fashion. The 
disagreement is whether this limitation should be conceived of 
epistemically, or metaphysically. One major intersection of contention 
comes from Locke’s letter to Stillingfleet. In it, Locke backs away 
from the claim that all bodies interact by impulse, but also remarks 
that he can yet conceive of another way they could interact. Locke 
goes on to mention that he has been persuaded by Newton’s 
Principia, not to presume to limit God’s power by putting into bodies 
‘powers and operations’ beyond what we can explain by matter.19  
For the purpose of this essay, I am not daring to venture an 
account of how the connection through resemblance is made. E. M. 
Curley has flatly stated Locke has no ‘general thesis’ of the 
perception of primary qualities.20 It will suffice for my purposes that 
at least he holds that they can be conveyed, and in a different manner 
than the ideas secondary qualities are—whether ultimately in some 
alternative causal manner, or by God’s active will. 
On my interpretation, the idea of figure can be received two ways 
simultaneously and coextensively with one another. First, two-
dimensional figures are received causally via colors which, through 
an act of judgment, appear as three-dimensional zigure. However, 
through the relation of resemblance, figure is represented as the 
genuine article. Consequently, Molyneux’s patient would have to 
touch the object to be certain whether the figure perceived was not 
merely zigure. To further tease out this interpretation and in particular 
how Locke, by positing two kinds figure, can maintain a passive 
judgment and thereby remain faithful to his empiricist predilections, 
we will need to examine how he conceives of an act of judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 John Locke, The Works of John Locke (London: Strahan, 1777), 561. 
20 E. M. Curley, "Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction Between Primary and 
Secondary Qualities," Philosophical Review 81, no. 4 (1972): 459. 	
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Judgment for Locke 
David Owen explains Locke’s view on judgment as analogous to 
his explanation of knowledge.21 For Locke, knowledge is the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas.22 Locke 
lists four ways how ideas can agree or disagree: identity or diversity, 
relation, co-existence or necessary connection, and real existence. 23 
Locke, then, offers three ways how these agreements (or 
disagreements) are perceived: intuitively, by demonstration, or 
through the senses.24 Locke gives the example of knowledge of our 
own existence by intuition, the existence of God by demonstration, 
and of external things by sensation.25 Judgment follows the same 
course as knowledge, except there is not a perception of an agreement 
or disagreement between ideas, only the presumption of one or the 
other.26 This is precisely why Locke takes the presumption of zigure 
as mere ‘mark’ of figure, and he explicitly says judgments are quick 
to be mistaken as perception. 
 
Abandon Common Sensibles, or Judgment? 
In Ralph Schumacher’s essay, What Are The Direct Objects Of 
Sight?, he insists that positing judgment to perceive figure would 
undermine Locke’s empiricist epistemology. As a good empiricist, 
Locke holds that all simple ideas are received passively by the mind. 
Locke compares the mind to a mirror, unable to refuse simple ideas 
whether we want them or not.27 Locke explains ideas are immediate 
objects of perception, thought, or understanding.28  
Vere Chappell notes that Locke uses the term idea 
indiscriminately, while those before him had used different names for 
 
21 David Owen, "Locke on Judgment," in Cambridge Companion to Locke's 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Lex Newman (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 406. 
22 Essay, IV.i.2. 
23 Ibid., IV.i.3. 
24 Owen, “Locke on Judgment,” 410. 
25 Essay, IV.ix.2. 
26 Owen, “Locke on Judgment,” 410; Cf. Essay, IV.xiv.4. 
27 Ibid., II.i.25. 
28 Ibid., II.viii.8. 
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different designations.29 Therefore, a lot of confusion has arisen in 
discussing Locke’s use of ideas, but what is clear is that they come in 
two flavors: simple and complex.  
Simple ideas for Locke either have a uniform appearance, or 
while being reflected upon in the mind, cannot be conceived to break 
down into other ideas.30 Chappell suggests Locke defines simple ideas 
in two sorts of ways, phenomenally and logically. If an idea is 
perceived as a unity with no division in it, it is phenomenally simple, 
whereas if an idea cannot be thought of as containing another idea, it 
is logically simple.31 Locke often invokes ideas of secondary 
qualities—or the proper sensibles—as prime examples of simple 
ideas. In addition to simple ideas, Locke also holds that there are 
complex ideas, which are also passively received. Chappell explains, 
for Locke, ideas we acquire from sensation or reflection are the 
products of compounding simple ideas. Ultimately, for Locke all the 
ideas we have can be abstracted in reverse to simple ideas, which we 
passively receive.  
Schumacher agrees with all the above regarding the passivity of 
receiving simple ideas. Therefore, he argues that since the passivity of 
the mind ensures for Locke that simple ideas are reliable signs of their 
external cause, any causal action by the mind—like judgment—in the 
reception of these simple ideas would cast aside the reliability of their 
cause.32 Schumacher then contends, rightly, that Locke rejects innate 
ideas of the mind. Any ideas produced by the mind are complex ideas 
made out of simple ones. Thus, the Lockean mind cannot comprise 
the simple idea of figure out of the simple ideas of colors. No simple 
ideas can be created out of other simple ideas. With this in mind, 
Schumacher explains that if Locke’s use of the word ‘form,’ as an 
action of a judgment, is to be taken to mean ‘alter’ or ‘change,’ then 
several difficulties arise.33 The first is an altered idea cannot be a 
 
29 Vere Chappell, "Locke's Theory of Ideas," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge Press, 1999), 28. 
30 Essay, II.ii.1. 
31 Chappell, “Locke’s Theory of Ideas,” 36. 
32 Ralph Schumacher, "What Are the Direct Objects of Sight?," Locke Studies 
3 (2003): 55. 
33 Essay, II.ix.9. 
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simple idea because part of the definition is simple ideas cannot be 
altered. The second is that Schumacher thinks it is difficult to 
conceive of the visual idea of figure as composed of various colors, 
since simple ideas have a uniform appearance. Lastly, since Locke 
says this visual idea of figure is different from all other visual ideas, 
Schumacher reasons Locke takes ‘form’ to mean ‘produce,’ which 
would clearly be in conflict with Locke’s empiricism. 34 Schumacher 
concludes that while Locke’s use of judgment makes his negative 
answer to Molyneux intelligible, it runs afoul central claims of his 
empiricist epistemology, and it is for those coherence reasons that it 
should be jettisoned. Moreover, Locke should have given a positive 
answer to Molyneux given his commitments to the common sensibles 
and that figure is a primary quality that resembles.35   
I agree with much of Schumacher’s view. We agree that Locke 
cannot say figure is a simple idea while it is composed of other simple 
ideas like color. However, I disagree that Locke takes the act of 
judgment to actually ‘produce’ the simple idea of figure. He 
specifically says that it takes the ‘mark’ of figure. On my account—
which I will explain below—the idea of zigure that arises from the 
judgment occurs from the presumed agreement of ideas in the mind. 
That is to say, Molyneux’s patient presumes the idea of a two-
dimensional figure, variously shaded, agrees with the idea of figure 
received by resemblance.        
 
A Novel Interpretation 
I will now weave together the core details above into a coherent 
account, resulting in an answer to the Molyneux question that allows 
Locke to adhere to his various philosophical doctrines. By my lights, 
Molyneux’s patient, upon regaining their sight and viewing the 
sphere, would see a variously shaded two-dimensional circle 
contemporaneously, as they perceived a three-dimensional figure. The 
idea of the two-dimensional circle is causally conveyed to a person, 
while the representational content of figure, originally conveyed via 
the modality of touch, via resemblance, would also be presented.  
 
34 Schumacher, “What are the direct objects of sight?,” 56. 
35 Ibid., 58. 
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Presumably, the idea of three-dimensional figure would be 
colorless in its representation, since color is peculiar to the modality 
of sight. Perhaps ideas of primary quality represent in the mind as in 
Flemish painting, with multiple points of view, being perceived by 
someone suffering from complete achromatopsia. Regardless of how 
an object is represented through resemblance, it seems reasonable to 
assume it would scarcely be taken noticed of relative to the colors that 
enshroud the surface on an object. In the same way, with the modality 
of touch, the simple idea of heat searing ones flesh would take the 
lion’s share of one’s attention, rather than shape of the hot rock felt. 
The role of judgment, collecting the various colors in the idea of 
a circle forming an idea of three-dimensional zigure, I take as entirely 
passive. On my view, the idea of two-dimensional figure is presumed 
to agree with the idea of three-dimensional figure, thus passing off the 
appearance of zigure.  It is strongly suggested Locke may have 
thought it was possible for someone to presume the agreement 
without the aid of touch. But they would not be able to know for 
certain until the object was touched.  
This claim is consistent with Locke’s wording in response to 
Molyneux. Locke seems to agree with Molyneux’s answer, but not 
necessarily with all of his reasoning. Locke explicitly states he agrees 
with this thinking man, not the thinking of the man. Furthermore, 
Locke says that at first a person would not be able to say for certain 
which was which, but could unmistakably name them via touch.36  
It is helpful to note that Locke composed most of his essay while 
in Holland during exile. During his stay, he frequented many art 
galleries.37 Locke explained that someone unskilled in painting would 
not believe there were no ‘protuberances’ in the images they saw, 
unless they touched the painting. An interesting point about judgment 
can be taken from this. The person viewing the painting could not be 
certain that they did not perceive ideas of primary qualities in the 
shapes of the objects, since the judgment presumed falsely an 
agreement between ideas of secondary quality of two-dimensional 
shapes with those of primary qualities. This is precisely why Locke 
 
36 Essay, II.ix.8. 
37 Michael Jacovides, "Locke and the Visual Array," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 85, no.1 (2012): 77-78. 
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takes ideas of secondary quality, such as colors, only to represent their 
causes, but not bodies. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
What I have endeavored to show is that Locke need not abandon 
his doctrine of common sensibles, or the resemblance of ideas of 
primary quality, or posit an overactive judgment to remain consistent 
in his answer to Molyneux. I take it within the scope of Locke’s 
philosophy that visual input taken from colors is received two-
dimensionally, and that we passively judge it to agree with our ideas 
of three-dimensional figure received by resemblance. In other words, 
it is within the pale of Locke’s philosophy to hold that there is an 
innate cross-modal faculty for representational content of ideas of 
primary quality, but this content needs to be empirically verified. This 
interpretation relies heavily on two theses. The first is that Locke held 
there was kind of figure, which I have referred to as zigure. The 
second, and likely more controversial claim, is that Locke came to 
believe that the mechanical philosophy of his day either could not 
epistemically account for the interaction of some bodies, or that it 
could not metaphysically account for this interaction. Consequently, 
this results in an epistemic distinction between objects encountered at 
the phenomenal level—those things that lend themselves to being 
empirically verified by two or more senses, and those objects at the 
sub-phenomenal level—accessible through only one sense modality.    
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